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Debtors’ prisons are alive and well in America despite being deemed unconstitutional.
Indigent defendants often find themselves caught in a cycle of unconstitutional bail, fines, and fees
that ultimately may land them in jail with no consideration of their indigency. These indigent
defendants have a route to relief through Section 1983, which provides a federal forum for those
plaintiffs deprived of federally protected rights by state actors. Unfortunately, awards of money
damages, while possible, are often out of reach.
This article primarily addresses the notion of municipal policymaker determinations. In
short, the plaintiff may pursue money damages against a municipality, but he often must show that
the action which deprived him of his constitutional right was made by a municipal policymaker. An
issue thus arises for the indigent defendant whose fate has been decreed by judicial order. For the
defendant to hold the municipality liable, he would need to show that the municipal judge who
issued the decree acted as a municipal policymaker. In making such policymaker determinations,
courts look to state law. If the applicable state law defines a municipal judge as part of the state
judiciary, then the judge cannot be a municipal policymaker. This formulaic determination often
prevents the indigent plaintiff from connecting the unconstitutional judicial order to the
municipality, which in turn prevents the plaintiff from receiving money damages from the city.
While at first glance the separation between a municipal judge and the municipality may
seem like a fair disconnect in order to protect the independence of the local judiciary, the reality is
that it may ignore the way in which some municipalities actually operate. To explain, local judges
are often hired and fired by the city, and recent cases reveal the pressure that some cities put on
judges to fund their own courts through fine and fee imposition. With this in mind, municipal judges
may actually come to set municipal policy – and policymaker determinations should reflect that.
This article proposes a solution: a functional approach to policymaker determinations.
Instead of simply relying on statutory definitions of judges, courts should look to the actual functions
that the judge is performing. If the judge is acting under the municipality’s authority and subject to
the municipality’s influence, then, in consideration of the judge’s actual function within the
municipality, he should be considered a policymaker for the locality. With this functional approach,
plaintiffs would be able to pursue money damages and connect allegedly unconstitutional judicial
orders to the corresponding responsible municipality.
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem Scenario
In Bearden v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court made clear that a state may not
imprison a person solely based on his inability to pay a fine.
1
In Bearden, the Court held that before
a defendant’s probation is revoked for non-payment of a court-ordered fine, a reviewing court must
inquire into that defendant’s ability to pay.
2
To do otherwise would be to punish him for his poverty;
and yet, what can be considered debtors’ prisons continue to crop up.
For example, imagine a scenario in which a judge sets bail, and the detained individual
must come up with $500. He is indigent and cannot pay. He remains in jail, though no determination
of guilt or innocence has been made. His neighbor in the next cell also needs $500 to meet bail, is
able to do so, and is therefore quickly released to his family.
Imagine another scenario in which a municipality relies on fines and fees to keep its
municipal court running. The municipal judge accordingly sets fee schedules for indigent
defendants but hires a third-party probation service to oversee the collection of monies. Themonthly
1
461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983) (holding that the state may not imprison a person solely based on the poverty or
inability of the individual to pay if he has shown bona fide efforts to do so).
2
Id.
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payment, then, is $50²$35 of which is allocated to so-called ³probation services.´
3
In this way, a
$250 traffic ticket turns into an exorbitant expense payable over several months, and if the
individual fails to make a single payment, the judge may order his incarceration.
4
This time, imagine a teen mother who has a warrant out for her arrest for a misdemeanor,
and the youth court judge overseeing her case prohibits the young mother from having custody of
her child until she pays her court fees in full.
5
These are not imagined scenarios at all. In fact, they are real situations in which indigent
defendants’ constitutional rights have been violated. What sort of relief might an individual in such
a case expect?
Perhaps declaratory or injunctive relief may be sought, which ostensibly would subject the
court to strict oversight or prevent it from continuing the unconstitutional practices. But what about
the indigent defendant who has been sitting in jail for days and is unable to work or look for work,
provide for his family, or prevent the loss of his vehicle or home after literally losing his liberty
prior to any determination of culpability? Theoretically, an award of money damages for that
plaintiff would be more appropriate, but this remedy is often difficult to realize.
Section 1983 of the United States Code is the road most plaintiffs travel to retrieve money
damages for such constitutional violations.
6
Put simply, a plaintiff may make a Section 1983 claim
against a municipality to seek money damages when a state actor violates his or her federally
protected rights. The key is that the claim must show the deprivation was caused by a municipal
custom, policy, practice or decision made by a municipal policymaker.
In the above scenarios concerning bail and fines, the constitutional violations stemmed
from a judicial order; it is only logical, then, to infer that the judge in each case acted as the
municipal policymaker. But there’s a catch in that judges enjoy immunity. As this article will show,
courts often hold that a judge, in performing a judicial act, cannot also be a municipal policymaker.
For this reason, plaintiffs typically cannot establish a nexus between an unconstitutional judicial
order and the municipality or city that employs the judge who issued such order. Instead, the city
can defend itself on grounds that its judges cannot be municipal policymakers, and because they are
immune, the city also cannot be found liable. In this way, the city becomes complicit in and helps
to perpetuate judicially decreed deprivations of constitutional rights. Plaintiffs thus face an uphill
battle in getting the monetary relief that they deserve.
This dynamic is especially troubling in light of the ways in which the branches of
government in some municipalities intersect. A city’s mayor often appoints or hires municipal
judges, whom the city pays as its employees and who, in some cases, are responsible for supplying
the city with money from defendants’ fines and fees. Such interplay between the local executive
and judicial branches blurs crucial dividing lines, and a judge can seem more like an executive
3
Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc. No. 2:12-CV-02819-RDP, 2017 WL 660842, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17,
2017).
4
See, e.g., id. at *4±8.
5
See, e.g., City of Pearl Youth Court, MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.macarthurjustice.org/case/5681-2/ [https://perma.cc/38KB-TCKV]; Radley Balko, Mississippi Judge Resigns
After Barring Mother from Seeing Newborn Because of Unpaid Court Fees, THEWASHINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2017, 11:23
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/10/26/mississippi-judge-resigns-after-barring-mother-
from-seeing-newborn-because-of-unpaid-court-fees/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.60c18e4b1426 [https://perma.cc/Y4T8-
9XYG].
6
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019).
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officer and less like an independent, judicial officer.
When courts make determinations of whether a judge is a municipal policymaker, they
should be able to consider how the functions of a particular municipality and of its judges might
operate in tandem. While plaintiffs may make some arguments in line with painting the judge as a
policymaker, a functional approach to determining who is a municipal policymaker is a more direct
and fairer route.
In a case that requires a determination of whether a judge is either a municipal policymaker
or state-level actor, a functional approach might shed light on that judge’s actual duties. A functional
approach would consider an individual judge’s actual role and duties within the municipality,
instead of relying on formulaic statutory interpretations, and it would uncover instances in which
the municipality placed undue pressure on a judge to collect fines and fees. A functional approach
would also help to uncover whether a municipality has been complicit in allowing unconstitutional
bail, fine, and fee arrangements to exist or flourish. In turn, the responsible municipality, and not
the judge, could be held liable; wronged plaintiffs could recover the damages to which they are
rightfully entitled.
Other areas of Section 1983 litigation employ a functional approach, so it would not be a
major stretch to extend the mode of analysis to policymaker determinations. More importantly,
doing so would create an easier route to recovery for deserving plaintiffs from municipalities and
would thus better serve the twin aims of Section 1983 litigation: compensation and deterrence.
Moving forward, this article first provides background regarding modern-day debtors’ prisons. It
proceeds with an explanation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s major elements, its history, purposes and
application. Then, discussion around immunity defenses, municipal liability, and the
interconnectedness of local government branches will set the stage for the article’s principal
argument in favor of a more functional approach in the determination of who is a local policymaker.
Thereafter, the article summarizes case examples that demonstrate the intersection of modern
debtors’ prisons, § 1983, judicial immunity and municipal liability. An argument as to the
appropriateness of a functional approach to policymaker determinations foregrounds the final
section of the article, where the author looks at the role of functional analyses in other areas of
§ 1983 via hypothetical examples. Finally, the article ends with a review of perceived limitations
inherent in a functional approach.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons
The traditional Dickensian portrayal of the debtor thrown in prison because he could not
meet his obligations to a private creditor is generally an abhorred image of the past. And yet,
debtors’ prisons have not died; in fact, they’ve evolved over time.
7
In the criminal justice system,
indigent defendants are regularly jailed for their inability to pay fines or fees or meet bail, and the
underlying transgression is often a misdemeanor offense.
8
Take, for example, Roelif Carter, a veteran living off of disability and food stamps, who
7
See generally Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2016)
(analogizing historical debtors’ prisons to the new debtors’ prisons created by the criminal justice system itself).
8
See id.
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is incarcerated after failing to make a $100 payment on an outstanding traffic ticket.
9
Also consider
Harriet Cleveland²a mother of three who was laid off from her job and jailed for over a month for
not carrying vehicle insurance.
10
She slept on the jail floor and was exposed to raw sewage from a
leaking toilet in her cell.
11
Both Carter and Cleveland spent time in jail for the ³crime´ of failing to
pay fines associated with minor offenses.
Money bail can also violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights where a judge fails to consider
his or her indigency. Imagine Perchelle Richardson, a teen who stole a cell phone and whose family
could not afford the $200 bond needed to secure her release.
12
Instead, she missed 51 days of school
to sit in jail, while a wealthy teen in the same circumstances would have easily met bail.
13
These
cases are not anomalies.
14
In the past few years, many major media outlets
15
and academics
16
have
9
Id. at 4.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 159±60 (2018).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 7, at 5 (³A 2015 class action lawsuit against the city of Austin, Texas,
tallied about 900 jailed debtors within a twelve-month period. And by one count, the city of Houston jailed people for
nonpayment of criminal justice debt in over 70,000 cases.´).
15
See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, Civil Rights Attorneys Sue Ferguson Over ‘Debtors Prisons’, NPR (Feb. 8, 2015,
9:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/08/384332798/civil-rights-attorneys-sue-ferguson-over-
debtors-prisons [https://perma.cc/38PV-H752]; Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 16, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc [https://perma.cc/RRX3-8FJF] (discussing the
prevalence of ³offender-funded justice´ in many states, particularly the South, and the troublesome ties between municipal
courts and private companies, particularly probation companies, which impose various fees and administrative costs on
indigent defendants on top of court-ordered fines and fees); The New Debtors’ Prisons, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013, at
46 (discussing the prevalence of imprisonment for nonpayment of debt, particularly in states with large prison populations);
Last Week Tonight, Municipal Violations: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, HBO (Mar. 22, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UjpmT5noto [https://perma.cc/9ZVA-4QFH] (describing the mounting debt accrued
for indigent individuals for failure to pay fines for minor traffic offenses, often resulting in incarceration, and the use of
private companies in collecting these debts); The Colbert Report, The Word – Debt or Prison, COMEDYCENTRAL (June 11,
2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/m87g43/the-colbert-report-the-word---debt-or-prison [https://perma.cc/T48M-
4WB5] (explaining how the costs of public defenders, probation, parole supervision, electronic monitoring, and jail stays
are shifted onto indigent defendants, which often leads to further incarceration); Alex Tabarrok, Debtor’s Prison for Failure
to Pay for Your Own Trial, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Apr. 18, 2012, 7:38 AM), https://marginalrevolution.com/
marginalrevolution/2012/04/debtors-prison-for-failure-to-pay-for-your-own-trial.html [https://perma.cc/M6LP-VQAH]
(discussing the increased use of various costs, fees, and fines on indigent offenders by state and local governments to shore
up budgets and the various consequences for failure to pay, such as ineligibility for public benefits, damaged credit reports,
and exclusion from housing and employment).
16
See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 7; Sarah Dolisca Bellacicco, Note, Safe Haven No Longer: The Role of
Georgia Courts and Private Probation Companies in Sustaining a De Facto Debtors’ Prison System , 48 GA. L. REV. 221
(2014); Torie Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme. How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New
Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 189 (2016) (describing the shift to the reliance on municipal fines to address
state and local budget shortfalls, the potential constitutionality issues associated with this system, the disparate effects on
poor and minority communities, and options for reform); Adec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure
of American Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 262±64 (2015) (providing accounts of individuals of color arrested and
imprisoned for failure to pay debts, mostly from old tickets).
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covered this explosion of debtors’ prisons and recounted the effects that such incarceration has on
the indigent defendant.
The real outrage, however, is that debtors’ prisons are unconstitutional, and the Supreme
Court said so explicitly in Bearden v. Georgia.
17
In Bearden, the Court held that if a defendant is
unable to pay a fine, there must be both an inquiry as to his inability to pay and a consideration of
alternative methods of punishment.
18
The holding should have meant that indigent defendants
would not be jailed simply for being poor, but such promise has not been realized. One commentator
has pointed to the unique setup of the justice system as part of the problem. Indigent defendants feel
pressure to plead guilty, and then, through court mechanisms such as probation services, drug
testing, and fee arrangements, these defendants are kept in almost constant contact with the criminal
justice system, making them more likely to miss a payment or receive additional fines.
19
Whatever
the underlying reason, the reality is that a modern day system of debtors’ prisons has developed.
There are various ways to address the debtors’ prison problem through meaningful reform
within local legislative and judicial arenas.
20
Indeed, some advocates look to legislatures and
judiciaries to reform the underlying laws or court rules,
21
while others have taken the approach of
investigative journalist to make people aware of what is happening by way of exposé.
22
Still, some
have chosen to initiate litigation not only as a means of securing damages for the wronged
individuals, but also as a tool to achieve change through the court system itself.
23
Clearly, then,
there are different methods for attacking the debtors’ prison problem, though this article explores
only the litigation route.
Specifically, this article delves into the quintessential Section 1983 claim and its pitfalls
with respect to the pursuit of money damages against a municipality for unconstitutional bail, fine,
and fee practices. I offer an explanation of why it is often difficult to show that a judge is, in fact, a
municipal policymaker, and propose a possible solution for the wronged plaintiff. To set the stage
for this analysis, this article first furnishes some of the historical context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Section 1983
1. Basic Elements
Section 1983 litigation arises when a plaintiff makes a claim that he was deprived of his
federally protected rights by a person acting under color of state law.
24
In short, if a person acting
17
461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983).
18
Id. at 672.
19
Colin Reingold, Pretextual Sanctions, Contempt, and the Practical Limits of Bearden-Based Debtors’
Prison Litigation, 21 MICH. J. RACE &L. 361, 362±63 (2016).
20
See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 7, at 44±46 (arguing for broader application of Bearden, beyond only those
debtors unable to pay and when alternatives are available, to all criminal debts and imprisonment-for-debt claims and
advocating for increased state protections for debtors).
21
Id. at 13.
22
Id. at 5.
23
Id. at 12±13.
24
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, ³[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss1/2
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under state or municipal authority deprives an individual of a constitutional right, then he may be
liable for damages under Section 1983. Common claims include use of excessive force by an officer;
employment concerns like hiring, firing, and discrimination; deliberate indifference to inmate needs
or prison conditions; mishandling of issues in government schools or mental health facilities; and
the unfair seizure of property.
25
Since the law’s enactment in 1871, case law has shaped the contours of Section 1983’s
role and scope. First, a plaintiff must prove the following elements in order to successfully state a
Section 1983 claim: (1) a deprivation of a federally protected right, usually constitutional, that (2)
was proximately caused (3) by an individual (4) acting under the color of state law.
26
When making
a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each of these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence.
27
However simply stated, each of these elements may trigger a
complicated analysis that puts a prospective plaintiff’s goals further out of reach. Yet another
challenge for plaintiffs in Section 1983 litigation is proving that money damages should be awarded
even if a constitutional violation is found to have occurred.
2. Damages
Understanding howdamages function under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lends additional insight with
respect to the barriers plaintiffs face in establishing that they are entitled to monetary damages. To
begin, Section 1983 allows for the full range of remedies²injunctive and declarative relief, as well
as nominal, punitive
28
, and compensatory damages.
29
The Supreme Court has singled out damages
as an essential part of Section 1983 litigation because they achieve a twofold effect of compensating
victims and deterring potential violators of constitutional rights.
30
The standard for determining damages in Section 1983 litigation was derived from
common law tort principles.
31
In essence, a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages if he
shows that a violation of his federally protected rights caused actual injury, which can include lost
future earnings, medical expenses, and forgone wages.
32
The Court has also made clear that
pursuing monetary relief solely by claiming that constitutional rights are themselves valuable will
not support an award of compensatory damages.
33
the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. . . .´
25
SeeMARTINA. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS ANDDEFENSES § 1.01 (4th ed. 2018).
26
Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, 17 TOURO L. REV. 525, 527 (2001); MARY
MASSARON ET AL., SWORD&SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (4th ed. 2015).
27
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.
28
While punitive damages are generally available in Section 1983, they are not available in a Section 1983
suit against a municipal entity. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (allowing for punitive damages where defendant’s
conduct was motivated by evil intent or reckless indifference). But see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271
(1981) (holding punitive damages are not available in a suit against a municipality).
29
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 16.04.
30
Id. (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)).
31
Id. (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986)).
32
Id.
33
Id. at § 16.05 (³[D]amages based on the abstract µvalue’ or µimportance’ of constitutional rights are not a
permissible element of compensatory damages in [§ 1983] cases.´ (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.
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In proving actual injury, the Court has held that plaintiffs may be awarded damages for
pain and suffering, emotional distress, impairment of reputation, and humiliation.
34
Claiming and
proving emotional distress damages are, however, two very different things. To prove that he is
entitled to damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff must present corroborated, detailed
evidence²for example, medical testimony or witness testimony.
35
Uncorroborated, conclusory
allegations of emotional distress will not, by contrast, support a finding of damages.
36
If a plaintiff
successfully establishes that he is entitled to an award for emotional distress, a jury will determine
the amount of damages owed.
37
But another obstacle to proving actual injury²even for the plaintiff who can otherwise
establish that he was deprived of a protected right²is the requirement that the damages incurred
thereby bemeasurable. Without such a showing, a plaintiff will be entitled only to nominal damages
for the violation of his rights.
38
The Court has maintained that the deterrence goal of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 will nevertheless be preserved in such cases, since the law enables plaintiffs to recover
punitive damages without a showing of actual injury.
39
The implication here is that responsible entities will still have to ³pay up´ through punitive
damages even where compensatory damages are not awarded. However, punitive damages are not
available as a remedy in suits against a municipal entity.
40
This means that if a plaintiff cannot easily
attach a provable dollar amount to the deprivation, the responsible municipality would essentially
be off the hook with respect to damages, since punitive awards are not an option. Therefore, a
constitutional deprivation could occur at the hands of a municipal entity, and yet, the deterrence
goal of Section 1983 litigation could be completely circumvented. Therefore, plaintiffs who cannot
tie constitutional violations to specific dollar amounts face yet another barrier that may undercut
the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself.
41
Evidently the Court only paid lip service to the importance of making monetary relief
available in Section 1983 litigation, as the hurdle plaintiffs must overcome to recover damages
299, 310 (1986))).
34
Id. at § 16.04 (³[C]ompensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary
harms, but also such injuries as µimpairment of reputation . . . personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’´
(quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. V. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986))).
35
Id. at § 16.05.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978).
39
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 16.04 (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
307 (1986)).
40
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that punitive damages are not
available against a municipality in a Section 1983 suit).
41
While this article focuses on how to show that a judge is a municipal policymaker when perpetuating
unconstitutional bail, fine, and fee practices, it should be noted that there are inherent barriers for indigent plaintiffs who
pursue money damages. The plaintiff’s indigency may make it difficult to show an actual injury such as lost wages, and the
standard for showing emotional distress damages is, in this author’s view, quite stringent. Further, the decision is ultimately
left to a jury which may be generally unsympathetic. In this way, even if a plaintiff is able to show that a judge is a municipal
policymaker and the municipality should be responsible for his unconstitutional orders, the resulting money damages may
not be very high. I query whether this limit is fair. Shouldn’t that plaintiff’s life and time be valuable even without a showing
of actual damages lost, and aren’t constitutional rights valuable to a free people in and of themselves?
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makes clear. The history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which evinces at least some legislative intent to center
the plaintiff, further underscores this disconnect.
3. Historical Background
The need for a federal civil rights statute arose in the aftermath of the Civil War due to the
unchecked violence of the Ku Klux Klan.
42
Federal officials were concerned that newly freed
individuals and their supporters might be deprived of their federally protected rights by state
officials acting under color of state law.
43
Thus, Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (which
would later become 42 U.S.C. § 1983) was passed in order to hold state officials accountable
through civil liability for their official acts.
44
Despite the narrower problem of Ku Klux Klan
violence that first spurred the need for this legislation, later SupremeCourt decisions have expanded
its application to provide redress for a wider scope of violations.
45
Section 1983 is now the primary
method by which a plaintiff can obtain relief for constitutional deprivation caused by a state actor.
46
To be clear, Section 1983 does not provide a claim for relief in and of itself; instead, it acts as
somewhat of a conduit for any claim that a federally protected right has been violated.
47
For this
reason, Section 1983 claims come in many different forms, and as more rights are protected at the
federal level, more Section 1983 claims become possible.
4. Expansion
Section 1983 remained relatively unused until the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape
in 1961. There, the Court recognized that a Section 1983 claim, as a claim separate from any state
law claim, provides a remedy regardless of whether a state law remedy is available.
48
Asmore rights
were incorporated against the states, more Section 1983 claims became viable.
49
Then, during the
height of Section 1983 expansion, the Supreme Court recognized the plaintiff-centric purposes of
the legislation. The Court noted the major goals of the legislation as ³compensation and
deterrence´
50
and explained that the primary purpose of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes was
42
SeeMonroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172±75 (1961) (summarizing the history of § 1983 and quoting a letter
President Grant wrote to Congress urging the passing of a bill to ³ . . . secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement
of law in all parts of the United States.´); see generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
43
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172±75.
44
Id.; see also David M. Coriell, Note, The Transferred Immunity Trap: Misapplication of Section 1983
Immunities, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 986 (2015).
45
See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
46
Id.
47
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). See also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (affirming
that the purpose of Section 1983 is to provide relief to victims and deter state actors from depriving people of their federally-
guaranteed rights); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590±91 (1978) (finding compensation of injured persons and
prevention of abuses of power to be the foundational policies of Section 1983); SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03 (finding
that the policies underlying Section 1983 include compensation for individuals when their federally-protected rights are
violated and prevention of future violations).
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to afford plaintiffs a route to relief.
51
Further, the court explained that the statute’s language should
be interpreted broadly.
52
At the heart of this case law is recognition of the fact that plaintiffs
wronged by state actors deserve relief.
Certain judges have extolled the benefits of Section 1983 by recognizing it as the
mechanism that has ensured some of the country’s most significant constitutional decisions to
date.
53
Cases such as Roe v. Wade, Brown v. Board of Education, Reynolds v. Sims, and Obergefell
v. Hodges all were initiated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
54
which one D.C. Circuit judge described as
³ . . . the workhorse of civil rights litigation.´
55
In sum, Section 1983 was originally needed to combat the gross constitutional deprivations
taking place in the Reconstruction-Era South, but its role was in no way limited to that function.
The Supreme Court, in many landmark decisions, has emphasized that Section 1983 has rightly
carved out its place as a hallmark of civil rights litigation. The legislation was created to allow
plaintiffs wronged by state actors to receive monetary and injunctive relief and to deter
constitutional wrongdoers.
5. Retraction: Criticism and Immunity Defenses
The expansion of Section 1983 is not, however, without its critics on the Court. Justices
Powell and Scalia believed that the expansion violated the law’s limited original purpose.
56
Others
have lamented it for increasing the likelihood for a state common law tort action to be paraded as a
federal claim,
57
while some justices have labeled it an intrusion on states’ rights
58
and a strain on
federal courts.
59
One possible consequence of such criticism is that, while Section 1983 does
provide several avenues of relief, the Court has also accepted corresponding defenses, especially
51
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03 (³The statute was thus enacted in order to create a federal remedy that
µprotects the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.’´ (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972))).
52
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978); SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
53
Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1±2 (1985). United States Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote this
entire journal article examining the history of Section 1983 and explaining the importance of its symbolic and practical
applications in today’s modern setting. In the article, Justice Blackmun also addresses Supreme Court cases that have made
it more difficult for plaintiffs to get relief and that have expanded immunities to cloak state entities with a veil of protection.
He ultimately queries whether the statute will remain a robust way to check those actors who would trample on individual
liberties. Finally, he concludes by stating, ³[w]hatever is the fate of Section 1983 in the future, I do hope that it survives both
as a symbol and as a working mechanism for all of us to protect the constitutional liberties we treasure.´
54
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.01.
55
Id. (quoting Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
56
See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (³The § 1983 that the Court
created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to what Congress enacted almost a century earlier.´); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 553 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (³In sum, it seems evident that the reasoning and decision of the Court today, even
if viewed as compatible with our precedents, create new uncertainties as well as invitations to litigate under a statute [§ 1983]
that already has burst its historical bounds.´); SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
57
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 1.03.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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immunity defenses.
The text of Section 1983 does not explicitly mention immunities,
60
but they are
traditionally recognized at common law and have been successfully deployed as defenses.
61
Such
immunities primarily serve the two-fold purpose of (1) allowing public officers to focus on their
jobs and not on time consuming litigation and (2) preserving public officials’ independent discretion
so that the constant fear of potential litigation does not cause poor decision-making.
62
When hearing
Section 1983 cases, judges may ³read in´ any common law immunity available at the time the law
was enacted as long as it is consistent with the legislation.
63
The next sections of this article further
describe the oft-used immunity defenses.
a. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity shields certain actors from liability even for acts that are
unconstitutional or outside the bounds of law.
64
Courts take a functional approach to determining
whether a defendant will be absolutely immune from liability in a Section 1983 suit: instead of
relying solely on a public official’s job title, courts look instead to both the nature of the job function
and the ways, if any, in which subjecting the public official to the possibility of litigation might
affect performance of that job function.
65
With this in mind, the Court has recognized absolute
immunity for legislators acting in a legislative capacity,
66
judges performing judicial acts,
67
and
prosecutors acting as advocates
68
as opposed to investigators.
69
Some courts have also extended absolute immunity to actors performing judicially oriented
functions and prosecutorial functions, such as court reporters, parole officers acting in a judicial
capacity, grand jurors, or social workers bringing suit on behalf of a child abuse victim.
70
Some
commentators have criticized this extension of absolute immunity, claiming that the legislative
history does not support such a defense and that immunity creates an extra barrier for the wronged
plaintiff to get relief.
71
60
42 U.S.C. 1983 (2019).
61
See Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial
Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMUL. REV. 265, 269 (2006).
62
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 504±24.
63
Id.
64
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 9.02.
65
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 504±06.
66
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 9.02. For example, a plaintiff cannot receive money damages if he sues a
legislator for signing on to what the plaintiff believes to be an unconstitutional law. The legislator is absolutely immune.
67
Id. In other words, a plaintiff may not sue a judge and receive money damages for making a ³bad´ decision.
The judge is absolutely immune.
68
Id. For example, a plaintiff may not sue a prosecutor because the prosecutor does his job in prosecuting a
case. The prosecutor is absolutely immune in that role.
69
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 504±24.
70
Id. at 514±22.
71
See generally Johns, supra note 61; see Coriell, supra note 44, at 1013.
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b. Qualified Immunity
Another type of immunity which is more limited in its scope is qualified immunity. If a
government official does not qualify for absolute immunity from personal liability, qualified
immunity may still shield them. First, to receive qualified immunity, the government actor must be
acting under their own discretion.
72
Second, the government official’s unconstitutional actions must
meet the reasonable person standard.
73
In other words, if an officer uses their discretion to violate a
person’s constitutional or statutory rights, but an objective reasonable person would not have known
that these actions were unconstitutional, then the officer may assert qualified immunity as a
defense.
74
While both absolute immunity and qualified immunity pose potential barriers for harmed
plaintiffs to recover money damages, judicial immunity makes litigation concerning bail, fines, and
fees especially difficult.
c. Judicial Immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 claims for damages arising from their
judicial acts.
75
There are only two limits to this immunity: if the judge acts completely without
jurisdiction, or if the act is not judicial, then absolute judicial immunity is not available as a
defense.
76
By extension, judges are also not immune from suits arising from conduct undertaken
outside of their official roles. Still, broad judicial immunity is rooted in the common law and its
long existence has been justified based on the potentially chilling effect that liability for judicial
acts could have on independent decision making and the availability of other remedies.
77
Usually, if a judge performs an act that is not judicial, the act is labeled ³administrative.´
Administrative acts have included tasks related to supervising a court employee, such as hiring,
firing, and demoting,
78
and most importantly, acting as an administrator of a juvenile detention
center or of a probation service.
79
For claims arising out of what is presumed to be a judge’s
administrative act, a judge may assert only qualified immunity.
80
Aside from these limited exceptions²a judge performing an administrative task, or a
judge acting completely outside of their role²judges have broad protection from incurring liability
in a suit. For this reason, if a defendant experiences a constitutional deprivation due to a judicial
order, he cannot simply sue the judge. The defendant turned plaintiff would instead have to find
another responsible entity to sue for relief. In cases concerning unconstitutional bail, fines, and fees,
the plaintiff may attempt to sue the municipality that employs the judge. The next section of this
72
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 525±28.
73
Id.
74
See id.; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that defendants receive qualified immunity
if ³their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.´).
75
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554±55 (1967).
76
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354±55 (1978).
77
See id. at 355±57; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554±55; MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 510±11.
78
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 510±12.
79
Id.
80
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 9.03.
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article describes how to make a Section 1983 claim against a municipality.
6. Municipal Liability/Monell
For purposes of this article, the most significant expansion of Section 1983 has been the
Supreme Court’s decision to recognize a municipality as a ³person´ as defined in the statute.
81
In
this way, a plaintiff who has been wronged by excessive bail, fines, or fees can pursue action against
the responsible city or policymaker. InMonell v. New York City Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court held that a municipality may be a ³person´ in the context of Section 1983.
82
The
municipality will not, however, be vicariously liable on the basis of respondeat superior for the
conduct of its employees.
83
In other words, a city that employs a person who violates an individual’s
constitutional rights will not be found liable for that wrongdoer’s actions. Instead, one can
successfully state a claim against a municipality only if the violation of the protected right was
caused by (1) a municipal policy, (2) a custom or practice,
84
or (3) a decision of a final
policymaker.
85
Methods for showing a custom, policy, or practice include demonstrating that an official
promulgation is illegal, showing an actual final policymaker ratified the unconstitutional conduct,
establishing that a training program was inadequate, or proving that a municipality acquiesced to a
custom or policy of a local office.
86
Essentially, a plaintiff may pursue the full range of damages in
a suit against a city, but they must show that there was a formal policy or widespread custom or
practice carried out by the city.
87
The plaintiff may also show that the decision that caused the
deprivation was made by a final policymaker, which I discuss further in the next section of this
article.
88
Finally, to prove that a municipality is liable, the plaintiff has to show that the municipal
policy or decision was the moving force behind the violation. Simply put, there must be a direct
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation.
89
For this article, understanding who
may be a municipal policymaker is therefore particularly important.
81
The Supreme Court has made three landmark decisions around the scope of municipal liability. In Monell
v. Department of Social Services, the court recognized that a municipality may be a ³person´ under the statute, and thus
suable. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). InOwen v. City of Independence, the court determined that employees acting in good faith
would not create a barrier to receiving damages from the municipality. 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). Finally, in City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, the court held that municipalities are absolutely immune from punitive damages in Section 1983 cases.
453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
82
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (³Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels
the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons
to whom § 1983 applies.´).
83
Id. at 691 (³In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs
a tortfeasor²or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.´).
84
Id. at 694.
85
Id.
86
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 272±88.; SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
87
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (³Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.´).
88
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 272±88; SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
89
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385±86 (1989).
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a. Policymakers
In defining who may be a municipality’s final policymaker, the court has considered
whether the individual (1) is a state or municipal officer as defined by state and local law and (2)
has discretionary or policymaking authority.
90
If he is defined as a municipal officer and has
policymaking authority, then he may be deemed a municipal policymaker.
91
The court has made
clear that determining whether an official is a final policymaker is a question of state, not federal
law, and in conducting its analysis, the court’s major question should be whether the decisionmaker
has final authority to make municipal policy.
92
Further, determining who is a policymaker is not a
question of fact, but law.
93
In practice, this means that policymaker determinations rely heavily on
what the applicable state laws say about the job in question. If a particular state law defines an actor
as a state actor, then he cannot be a municipal policymaker, even if in practice, he is working for
the municipality.
The most obvious example of a municipal policymaker would be the entity’s legislative
body, since the local legislature fashions official policy.
94
A more challenging policymaker
determination, however, might be the county sheriff who has the discretion to hire an employee but
who acts under another county board that sets official county employment policy.
95
The sheriff may
be a final policymaker if the county board delegated its power to him, but he would not be a
municipal policymaker if the board iterated the final policy and the sheriff simply followed the
handed down policy.
96
In this example, the court analyzes who is an ³official policymaker´
according to the law, but it does not consider all of the primary functions the sheriff may perform
for the municipality. This example shows how convoluted the ³Who is a policymaker?´ question
can become.
The current state law specific standard may also be limited in that it seems to rely too
heavily on formulaic statutory definitions instead of real-world job functions. To illustrate, in
McMillian v. Monroe County, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a county sheriff was a
county actor or state actor under Alabama state law.
97
The court reiterated that an inquiry into who
qualifies as a local actor is dependent on that official’s role as defined by state law.
98
The Court
then went through a lengthy analysis of Alabama’s Constitution, the framers’ intent regarding
sheriffs, and Code sections pertaining to sheriffs.
99
The court ultimately decided solely based on
90
See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986);
MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 272±88; SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
91
See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 (1986).
92
McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)
93
See id; MASSARON ET AL., supra note 26, at 272±88; SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
94
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
95
See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 (Justice Brennan presented this exact scenario and explained that if the
Board set final policy, then the Sheriff could not be a final policymaker, but if the Board delegated its own power to the
Sheriff to oversee hiring and firing, then the Sheriff could be a final policymaker). See also MASSARON ET AL., supra note
26, at 272±88 and SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 7.15.
96
See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12.
97
520 U.S. at 781.
98
Id. at 786.
99
Id. at 787±91.
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those documents showing that sheriffs were state actors and not municipal policymakers in
Alabama.
100
On the other hand, the petitioner inMcMillian pointed out that Alabama sheriffs were paid
by the county, provided with county equipment and lodging, limited in jurisdiction solely to the
county, and elected locally by county citizens. These factors, demonstrating the actual local function
of the sheriff’s job, were not enough to persuade the court that the sheriff was a county
policymaker.
101
So, while the current state law-specific standard lends some predictability to the
process of determining who is a policymaker²either an applicable state law defines an individual
as a state actor or not²it may, at times, overlook compelling facts that suggest a different result.
Another limitation to the state law-specific analysis is that it can and does produce different
results across states. In McMillian, the petitioner argued that the court’s approach would result in
inconsistent policymaker determinations throughout the country.
102
The Court rebutted by
emphasizing the federal nature of our government: states may organize their localities as they see
fit, so it is natural that municipal policymaker determinations differ from state to state.
103
The Court
explicitly rejected a uniform national characterization of sheriffs, calling the approach a
³blunderbuss.´
104
In effect, the McMillian Court seemed to advance an argument that only two approaches
to policymaker determinations exist. On one hand is its preferred approach, the state law analysis;
on the other is a system that would uniformly characterize municipal policymakers (or, at least
sheriffs, in the instant case). Is there a middle ground approach that considers state law but also
engages in an analysis of how an official actually performs their functions in practice? Indeed, the
primary goal of this article is to demonstrate that a more functional approach to municipal
policymaker determinations may produce more just results in litigation addressing unconstitutional
bail, fine, and fee practices.
For this article, the predominant question is whether a municipal judgemay also be deemed
a final policymaker for purposes of suits brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Most courts
maintain that judges acting in their official ³judicial´ capacity cannot be final policymakers. As
discussed in the aforementioned sheriff example, this state law-specific inquiry can become an
arbitrary test that generates inconsistent results and ignores important facts about the ways in which
an official performs their actual function.
100
Id. at 793. Here, the Court did consider the sheriff’s functions as described by the state law. For example,
the Court noted that pursuant to the Alabama Code, the Governor and Attorney General have control over the sheriff when
they direct him to conduct an investigation. This shows that there is a small element of considering the policymakers
function, but the problem still exists in that such an approach relies only on how the state law defines the role, not how the
official is actually conducting himself.
101
Id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the state law dependent analysis and stating, ³[a] sheriff
locally elected, paid and equipped, who autonomously sets and implements law enforcement policies operative within the
geographic confines of a county, is ordinarily just what he seems to be: a county official. Nothing in Alabama law warrants
a different conclusion. It makes scant sense to treat sheriffs’ activities differently based on the presence or absence of state
constitutional provisions of the limited kind Alabama has adopted.´).
102
Id. at 793.
103
Id. at 795.
104
Id.
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b. When a Municipal Judiciary is Influenced by the Local Executive Branch
The reality that some municipal courts do not function as independently as one would hope
further complicates the policymaker analysis. Instead, some municipal judges may be hired and
fired by the mayor or city council and carry out their functions subject to potential oversight by the
executive and legislative branches.
105
Further, some municipal financing structures put pressure on
local judiciaries to generate revenue so that the court is self-funded.
106
This demonstrates the
interconnectedness of the local executive and ³judicial´ branches. The judiciarymay at times appear
to be more of an administrative arm of the executive instead of an independent judiciary. Such an
arrangement is ripe for abuse and puts judges in conflicted positions.
For example, in the aftermath of Mike Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, the
Department of Justice investigated the city and issued a report.
107
One major finding of the report
was that the municipal court of Ferguson had been operating with the end goal of generating
revenue, and the interconnectedness of the city’s branches undoubtedly played a role.
108
The report
stated, ³City, police and court officials for years have worked in concert to maximize revenue at
every stage of the enforcement process, beginning with how fines and fine enforcement processes
are established.´
109
The report goes on to detail numerous egregious instances in which the
municipal court violated defendants’ constitutional rights to improve the city’s bottom line.
110
Such
cases may, in fact, be doubly unconstitutional in that (1) an indigent defendant may have a fine or
fee unconstitutionally imposed on them and (2) it is patently unconstitutional for a judge to have
significant pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case.
111
105
See Jordan v. Smith, 669 So. 2d 752 (Miss. 1996). In Jordan, the mayor of Greenwood was in a dispute
with the Greenwood City Council on whether his executive appointments (including the municipal judge appointment) were
subject to approval by the City Council. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court explained, ³ . . . although the Legislature has
specifically defined the council’s role as legislative and the mayor’s role as executive, the Legislature has also required the
two entities to jointly decide on city department directors, members of municipal boards and a plethora of other municipal
authorities and commissions, most of which have unquestionably executive functions.´ Id. at 757. Further, the court stated,
³[t]he governing authorities of the City of Greenwood are clearly authorized to appoint a municipal judge and the other
officers here involved. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3 (1972). The question here involved is apportionment of
responsibility for appointments among the constituent elements of municipal authority. While the city council has no
authority to appoint, nothing in our statutes or precedents denies the Council an advice and consent role in the appointive
process. In such circumstances, the governing authorities of Greenwood is free to adopt the ordinances here questioned.
Miss. Code Ann. § 21-17-5 (1972) (µThe governing authorities of every municipality . . . shall have the power to adopt any
orders, resolutions or ordinances with respect to municipal affairs . . . which are not inconsistent with the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890, the Mississippi Code of 1972, or any statute or law of the State of Mississippi. . . .’).´ Id. In other
words, this is an example of how a municipality may have freedom in crafting how it appoints municipal judges. Clearly, in
an appointive process like the one Greenwood employed, bright lines between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches may be hard to find.
106
See Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. La. 2017).
107
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVILRIGHTSDIVISION, INVESTIGATIONOFTHE FERGUSONPOLICEDEPARTMENT
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department
_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WZ4-BJV7].
108
Id. at 3.
109
Id. at 10.
110
Id. at 42, 44, 45±46, 48±54, 57, 59±60.
111
Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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To illustrate, in Tumey v. Ohio, the defendant had been issued a fine for possessing
liquor.
112
The money collected from such fines was put into a pool that was then disbursed between
the state and locality.
113
From this pool, the convicting judge’s
114
salary was paid, and thus, the
judge’s salary was dependent on the number of convictions issued.
115
The Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated where a judge’s service is tied to the rate of
conviction.
116
In other words, due process is violated where the convicting judge has a pecuniary
interest in a case over which they preside.
117
The holding in Tumey thus has been used to justify a
grant of declarative relief in modern cases involving unconstitutional bail, fine, and fee practices.
118
Some courts, then, have recognized the unconstitutionality of pressuring municipal judges
into funding their own courts’ expenses through the imposition of fines and fees. This recognition
demonstrates that there is a point at which the fluidity of decision-making between the local
judiciary and the other branches becomes unacceptable. Why, then, allow a responsible
municipality to insulate itself from liability in Section 1983 cases involving unconstitutional judicial
orders?
II. ARGUMENT
A. Recap: Putting the Pieces Together
Debtors’ prisons are unconstitutional, but they still crop up at times in the context of
municipal courts’ bail, fine, and fee practices. Wronged plaintiffs may pursue damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983, which was created to give individuals a path to relief
when state actors have violated their federally protected rights. Further, Section 1983 operates with
the twin aims of giving compensation to injured individuals and deterring constitutional
wrongdoers. While the doctrine has been expanded in the past half century, courts also have
recognized certain defenses such as absolute and qualified immunity, which can circumvent the
compensation and deterrence functions of the law itself.
112
Id. at 516.
113
Id. at 516±20.
114
Interestingly, the judge in Tumey was also the mayor, which further demonstrates the potential for
interconnectedness in local government branches.
115
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531±32.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See generally Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. La. 2017). In Cain, plaintiffs sued
the city of New Orleans under Section 1983 alleging several violations of their constitutional rights including fines imposed
without indigency determinations and a scheme of money bonds that were used to fund certain judicial offices. There was
ample evidence that the city court was being funded through a structure that pressured judges into issuing more fines and
fees in order to operate the court. The Court found this structure unconstitutional and stated, ³[t]his funding structure puts
the Judges in the difficult position of not having sufficient funds to staff their offices unless they impose and collect sufficient
fines and fees from a largely indigent population of criminal defendants.´ Id. at 655. The Court went on to state, ³[p]laintiffs
have established that the Judges’ dual role creates a µpossible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the state and the accused.’´ Id. The court also noted that the judges’ conflict of interest existed by no fault of their
own, but through the fault of the city choosing to inadequately fund the court and then placing the judge in the predicament
of having to fund court operations.
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In the context of municipalities’ bail, fine, and fee regimes, the judicial immunity defense
poses the most difficult hurdle. The sued municipality may assert that the conduct that caused the
constitutional deprivation was a judicial order made by an immune judge who cannot be a municipal
policymaker. Essentially, the argument is that money damages are inappropriate because the judge
is immune from such a suit, and he is the actor that caused the deprivation. In turn, the argument
extends to the municipality, which can claim that the judge is not a municipal policymaker, so the
city should not have to pay money damages even if constitutional violations did occur.
Next, arguing that the immune judge is a municipal policymaker that instituted a municipal
custom, policy, or practice is often difficult because courts typically hold that a municipal judge is
not a policymaker when performing a judicial act. A common result of this conundrum is that
plaintiffs cannot receive money damages in cases involving unconstitutional bail, fine, and fee
practices. This, in turn, undermines Section 1983’s historical policy justifications in favor of
compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. Further, not recognizing the judge as a municipal
policymaker can obfuscate the interconnectedness of the executive and judicial branches of
government.
To further show how all of these issues converge to form an uphill battle for plaintiffs,
consider the following case examples, which demonstrate potential outcomes of the argument that
³the judge is a municipal policymaker.´. These examples also demonstrate how a local judiciary
may act in concert with other city branches, raising important questions about the need to safeguard
judicial independence.
B. Case Examples
1. Judge Not Recognized as a Policymaker
In Ray v. Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. an Alabama municipal court judge
recommended that the city mayor hire a third-party probation service to oversee the municipal
court’s probation scheme and fine and fee collections.
119
The city mayor subsequently entered into
a contract with defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. (³JCS´). The municipal judge, by all
accounts, did not sign the contract and was not responsible for hiring the service.
120
Two of the
plaintiffs in the case had received, as defendants, minor traffic tickets and had been subsequently
ordered to pay fines.
121
Because they could not afford to do so, the judge referred them to probation
with JCS, which required the plaintiffs to pay the fine in installments.
122
JCS would ultimately come
to collect an additional, probation servicing fee, which only extended the plaintiffs’ period of
indebtedness further.
123
Because probation violators could be sentenced to time in jail for failure to
119
Ray v. Judicial Corrs. Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 660842, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2017).
120
Id.
121
Id. at *8±9.
122
See id. at *2±3, *22 (³According to Plaintiffs, the City’s µpractice and policy’ treated poor people less
favorably than wealthier people because Municipal Court defendants who were able to pay the imposed fines and costs did
not face the additional burden of probation under JCS’s supervision, whereas defendants who were unable to pay those fines
and costs were placed on probation, charged additional fees, and subjected to threats of incarceration.´).
123
Id.
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meet their payment obligations,
124
the two traffic violators were arrested after violating the judge’s
order that they satisfy their debt during twenty-four months of probation.
125
As a result of his arrest,
one plaintiff was required to come up with over $500 to meet bail.
126
When the Ray plaintiffs subsequently filed a Section 1983 claim against the city, the court
determined that they had not successfully shown that a municipal policy or custom existed, since
their claims stemmed from ³judicial,´ and not ³municipal,´ acts.
127
Further, when conducting the
policymaker analysis, the court found that officers of the municipal court were state officials (not
municipal policymakers), and thus, the city could not be liable for the unconstitutional judicial
practices.
128
The Ray case reveals the ways in which it might be plainly unreasonable, and deficient as
a matter of fairness, to afford judges in this context any sort of immunity. For one, the municipality
clearly sanctioned the Ray judge’s behavior and that of JCS by agreeing to contract with the
probation services company in the first place. Implicit in that agreement was a desire on the
municipality’s part to increase revenue²and JCS touted its ability to achieve as much on its
website.
129
One of its claims included the guarantee that JCS’s ³ . . . supervision of probationers
was µcompletely offender-funded’ with no expense to taxpayers, and that µ[c]ourt collections have
increased in every community that has made the transition to JCS.´
130
Themunicipality thus worked
alongside JCS to help the Ray judge promulgate an extortionate probationary scheme that negatively
affected indigent defendants.
Second, because the court relied on state statutory language defining municipal judges as
state actors, no real consideration of the judge’s actual position within the city was made. A more
fact-intensive inquiry might have revealed both the local nature of the municipal judge’s role and
the pressure that the executive was putting on the judiciary to generate revenue. A more functional
analysis with fact specific inquiries might also have demonstrated that the municipal judge in this
case was a state actor in name only, and a finding that he acted as a municipal policymaker when
he issued the judicial decree in Ray would have been justified.
The municipality in Ray, however, was able to insulate itself from liability by hiding
beneath the judge’s robes and claiming, matter-of-factly, that he could not be a municipal
policymaker. By extension the municipality was able to fend off claims of constitutional
deprivation, despite its having pressured the judge to fund his court and its direct hiring of JCS. And
124
Id. at *2, *13.
125
Id. at *8±9.
126
Id.
127
Id. at *31.
128
Id. at *9, *25±31.
129
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S ³OFFENDER-FUNDED´ PROBATION
INDUSTRY (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter, ³HUMANRIGHTSWATCHWEBSITE´] (quoting Judicial Correction Services, ³For the
Community,´ undated, http://judicialservices.com/what-we-provide/for-the-community/), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-probation-industry [https://perma.cc/C3U3-R4XF]. See also
Judge T. Brad Bishop & Laura E. Yetter, The Continuing Reformation of Alabama’s Municipal Courts, 79 ALA. LAWYER
191, 193 (2018) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WEBSITE) (³JCS guaranteed that its supervision of probationers was
µcompletely offender-funded’ with no expense to taxpayers, and that µ[c]ourt collections have increased in every community
that has made the transition to JCS’ . . . [p]rivate probation companies like JCS that operate on an µoffender-funded’ basis
require probationers to pay the entire costs of probation services rendered.´).
130
HUMANRIGHTS WATCHWEBSITE, supra note 129.
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for the numerous indigent individuals who sat in jail cells over fines associated with minor offenses
like traffic violations? The policymaker determination in this case effectively denied them a chance
to secure monetary relief.
131
2. Judge Recognized as Policymaker
As aforementioned, one way to combat an immunity defense in these cases is to argue that
the judge is in fact a policymaker, though, as this article has demonstrated, such an argument is not
likely to succeed. A recent Fifth Circuit case, Odonnell v. Harris County, is also illustrative.
132
The
plaintiff sued the county, the county judge, the sheriff, and other county officials for their practice
of setting bail, which resulted in the detention of indigent defendants without consideration of their
ability to pay.
133
Contrary to many court findings,
134
the Fifth Circuit found that the county judge
in Odonnell was acting as a final policymaker under Section 1983 and thus, the county could be
liable for his decisions.
135
In its reasoning, the Odonnell court employed a formulaic analysis of pertinent Section
1983 decisions.
136
The judge was considered a county policymaker only because the Texas State
Constitution defined a county judge as a ³county officer´ and not as a state officer.
137
The court in
131
See, e.g., Cunningham ex rel. Cunningham v. City of W. Point Miss., 380 F. App’x 419, 421±22 (5th Cir.
2010) (affirming the district court’s decision that ³there was no valid policymaker on whom the City’s alleged § 1983
municipal liability could be pinned.´); Garcia Guevara v. City of Haltom City, 106 F. App’x 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2004)
(declining to find liability because ³[t]he relevant decisions were made, not by a City policymaker, but by a municipal judge
acting in his judicial capacity.´); Whisenant v. City of Haltom City, 106 F. App’x 915, 917 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
city could not be held liable for a judge acting as a state judicial officer, but could on behalf of the city council as a
policymaking entity); Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1994) (³[T]he Judge’s obligation to address
the rights of defendants arises from his membership in the state judiciary. It is lamentable, but irrelevant, that he failed
miserably to meet this obligation under both state and federal standards: he simply is not a municipal decision maker in this
context.´); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding a municipal judge’s repeated decision to jail an
indigent without offering counsel could not demonstrate a municipal policy in order to establish municipal liability); Bigford
v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1988) (³Finally, although Bigford presented some evidence that Sheriff Taylor was
aware of the delay in returning the truck and did nothing to resolve it, the sheriff was not the county’s policymaker as to
such judicial matters, as opposed to law enforcement matters. There is no evidence that the county’s governing body or other
high officials approved or were even aware of the magistrate’s failure to act.´).
132
Odonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
133
Id.
134
See supra note 131, collecting cases.
135
Odonnell, 892 F.3d at 155.
136
Id. (³Liability under Section 1983 attaches to local government officers µwhose unlawful decisions
represent the official policy of the governmental unit.’ Whether an officer has been given this authority is µa question of state
law.’ µOfficial policy’ includes unwritten widespread practices that are µso common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy.’ And unlawful decisions include µacquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom
which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.’´ (internal citations omitted) (first
quoting Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); then quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986); and then quoting Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)).
137
Id. (³Though a judge is not liable when µacting in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state law,’ we
agree with the district court that County Judges are policymakers for the municipality. Texas law explicitly establishes that
the Judges are µcounty officers.’´ (quoting Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992); and then quoting Tex. Const.
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Ray adopted a similar approach, only to determine that the judge there was not a municipal
policymaker because Alabama’s code did not define municipal judges as local officers. Evidently,
then, courts’ reliance on local statutory and constitutional language, without further consideration
of how a municipality and its actors actually function, results in arbitrary holdings in Section 1983
litigation.
138
Further, it may leave wronged plaintiffs without a clear path to holding a municipality
liable for the actions of a judge acting in his municipal capacity.
C. A Better Solution? A Functional Approach
The disparate holdings of Ray and Odonnell suggest a need to locate a more balanced
approach for courts whereby they rely less heavily on statutory language and more seriously assess
the judge’s actual role within the municipality. Such an approach might be helpful to plaintiffs
asserting constitutional deprivation. Instead of engaging in a myopic analysis that generates
inconsistent results, why not take a more functional approach to determining whether a judge is a
municipal policymaker? The proposition is this²for municipal policymaker determinations, an
assessment of the facts surrounding a particular judge’s actual function should augment a court’s
review of local statutes and constitutions.
1. Description
Courts should take a functional approach to determining whether a judge is a municipal
policymaker where plaintiffs assert Section 1983 claims that rest on a pattern of unconstitutional
judicial practices in a municipality. This functional analysis would not affect the municipal judge’s
individual immunity; instead, it would simply draw a line connecting the judge’s unconstitutional
actions to the municipality’s employment of that judge and, by extension, its complicity in allowing
such custom, policy, or practice to develop.
A functional approach, rather than a formulaic one, could also be useful in shedding light
on the tangled web that municipal governments may resemble. Often, mayors have the power to
hire and fire these judges, set judicial salaries, and define judges’ roles. This type of executive
oversight makes the municipal judge function as more of an executive officer. A functional
approach would consider the individual judge’s actual role and duties within the municipality and
would uncover instances in which the municipality placed undue pressure on the judge to collect
fines and fees. A more functional approach would demonstrate when a municipality was actually
Art. V § 24)); see also West v. City of Santa Fe, Texas, No. 3:16-CV-0309, 2018 WL 4047115, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16,
2018) (³The Fifth Circuit recently held in Odonnell that county court at law judges are municipal policymakers for post-
arrest practices in light of their µbroad authority to promulgate rules that will dictate post-arrest policies consistent with the
provisions of state law.’´).
138
Also, consider the Supreme Court’s analysis of whether a sheriff was a municipal policymaker in
McMillian. McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 786±88 (1997). While constitutional and statutory definitions
played the central role in the analysis, the court did at least consider how the state law described the official’s functions.
Lower court cases, on the other hand, seem to shy away from engaging in a robust analysis of all the relevant constitutional
and statutory provisions. In Odonnell, for example, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis was limited solely to a two-word definition
in the Texas Constitution. Odonnell, 892 F.3d at 155 (³Texas law explicitly established that the Judges are µcounty
officers’. . . .´ (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V § 24)). Lower courts, then, seem to be taking a less thorough approach by
identifying some type of state law that defines the actor as either state or local and stopping there in the analysis.
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complicit in allowing unconstitutional bail, fine, and fee arrangements to persist. The responsible
municipality, then²and not the judge²could be held liable, and wronged plaintiffs could recover
the damages they deserve. This functional approach would not actually affect the individual judge’s
immunity from liability, and more significantly, would be consistent with Section 1983’s goals of
compensation and deterrence.
2. Other Areas of Section 1983 Litigation that Employ a Functional Approach
Further, the argument for a functional analysis when considering whether a municipal
judge is a policymaker is not a novel one. Other areas of Section 1983 litigation already employ a
functional analysis. Take, for example, determinations of immunity. When determining whether an
officer should receive absolute immunity, qualified immunity, or no immunity, courts look to the
facts of the situation and the actual role that the officer was performing²not some formulaic
definition of the officer’s job as contained in a local statute or constitution.
139
The Court has
maintained that a determination of immunity is made according to functionality and not job title.
140
To illustrate, in Forrester v. White the Supreme Court had to determine whether a judge
was entitled to absolute immunity in a suit where a former court employee sued the judge for
discharging her in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
141
The court reiterated that an analysis
of whether the function in question was judicial or adjudicative was essential to determining
whether the judge was entitled to absolute immunity.
142
The Court conducted an analysis of the
judge’s actions to find that, in firing the employee, the judge was acting in an administrative
capacity, rather than a judicial one.
143
The court did not simply rely on a statutory definition of
³judge´ and thereby grant absolute immunity. Instead, the court noted that non-adjudicative
functions, like hiring and firing, did not require immunity and even likened the judge’s actions to
those of executive branch officials.
144
The important concept to note here is not that the judge
ultimately did not receive immunity; it’s that the court made a fact-specific inquiry into the judge’s
actual function.
145
139
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 9.02(B).
140
In discussing whether a judge should receive immunity or not, the court explained, ³[d]ifficulties have
arisen primarily in attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that
simply happen to have been done by judges. Here, as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.´ Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
141
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 220 (1988).
142
Id. at 229.
143
Id. at 229±30.
144
Id. at 229 (³In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in an administrative
capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts²like many others involved in supervising court employees
and overseeing the efficient operation of a court²may have been quite important in providing the sound adjudicative system.
The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative. As Judge Posner pointed out below, a judge
who hires or fires a probation officer cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a district attorney who hires and fires
assistant district attorneys, or indeed from any other Executive Branch official who is responsible for making such
employment decisions. Such decisions, like personnel decisions made by judges, are often crucial to the efficient operation
of public institutions . . . yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute immunity from liability in damages under Section
1983.´).
145
For other Supreme Court cases where the Justices employed the functional approach in making immunity
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Theoretically, in making policymaker determinations, courts could employ a similar fact-
specific, situation-dependent analysis. Instead of relying on statutory definitions of whether a judge
is a state or local official, courts could look at how the judge is actually functioning. For example,
in Ray,
146
this functional analysis may have revealed that the municipal judge was acting for the
city²not as a part of larger state judiciary. A functional approach might have led to a conclusion
that the judge in Ray was functioning as an arm of the city due to the pressure it placed on him to
collect more fines and fees. The judge’s delegation of probation oversight to JCS could be viewed
as a policy decision made by the local judge and mayor in tandem. A consideration of the facts on
the ground would demonstrate that the judge was not functioning as an independent part of the state
judiciary but as an integral part of the local government, and for that reason, a determination that
he was a municipal policymaker would have been appropriate. In turn, the responsible city could
have been liable for money damages for the unconstitutional probationary practices.
A more functional approach also crops up in Eleventh Amendment immunity
determinations. Courts take into account different factors when determining whether an entity is a
state or municipal entity for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes.
147
Courts may consider
whether the entity is engaging in a function for the state or local government, the source of funding,
and whether the entity is subject to state control.
148
Using these factors, a court would be more likely
to discern the true nature of the relationship between a judge and a municipality. In turn, a
determination that a judge is in fact a municipal policymaker instead of a state actor might be more
readily revealed. Instead of only relying on a rote definition, courts could consider a variety of
factors when considering whether an entity is state or local. This same kind of logic should be
employed in making policymaker determinations. There are, however, limitations to a functional
approach.
D. Limitations to a Functional Approach
First, a functional approach in policymaker determinations may be criticized in that it adds
an extra layer of analysis to the current one. Currently, courts can look to a state’s constitution or
code, and if a judge is defined as part of a larger state judiciary, then he cannot be a municipal
policymaker. That type of definition would end the policymaker analysis, and the municipality
would be off the hook.
On the other hand, if the state constitution or code defined the judge as a ³local actor,´
then he could be a policymaker, thereby bringing a swift end to the policymaker analysis. The point
is that the current statutory policymaker analysis lends ease to policymaker determinations. There
is no need to dig further into the judge’s day-to-day actions and interactions with the other local
government branches. To employ a functional approach would add an extra layer of complexity,
though it arguably would give plaintiffs more fair, consistent results from state to state.
Another argument against employing a functional approach to policymaker determinations
determinations, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991), and Cleavinger v.
Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
146
Ray v. Judicial Corrs. Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 660842 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2017).
147
See Ainsworth Aristocrat Int’l Party v. Tourism Co., 818 F.2d 1034, 1038 (1st Cir. 1987) (³The decision
whether a state institution or entity is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes should not be made
without a full examination of all the factors.´); SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at § 8.10(D)(1).
148
Id.
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is that there may be less dramatic ways for plaintiffs to pursue money damages against a
municipality. For example, one potential route around the ³judge as a policymaker´ conundrum is
to make a claim against a municipal actor other than a judge. For example, a plaintiff could make
the policymaker claim against a court clerk that collects fees or the probation service that oversees
fine and fee collecting.
To illustrate, in Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, a class action was filed against a
Georgia probation service by two women who had been put on probation while they paid off traffic
violation fines.
149
Sentinel, the probation service, would require the plaintiffs to pay for drug tests
even though that was not a condition of their probation.
150
If the defendants did not comply, they
were threatened with immediate incarceration.
151
Instead of suing the municipality based on the
judge’s original order, these plaintiffs sued the probation service under Section 1983 for creating
unconstitutional policies and practices in performing their probationary duties.
152
Based on these
circumstances, the defendants entered into a settlement agreement which included injunctive relief,
a consent order, and an $80,000 pool for plaintiffs to recover some of the money spent on the
unnecessary drug tests.
153
This case demonstrates that with creative pleading, plaintiffs may have a chance at
receiving money damages without a ³judge as a policymaker´ analysis standing in their way. In
other words, instead of changing the way that a court defines policymakers, plaintiffs may attempt
to make a different type of claim in order to receive the money damages they deserve.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, a functional approach to making policymaker determinations is not without its
shortcomings. Altering the current analysis in favor of a functional analysis complicates the process,
and there may be less drastic avenues for plaintiffs to pursue when attempting to get money
damages. On the other hand, Section 1983 was created for the purposes of compensating those
deprived of their rights and deterring prospective wrongdoers. The current policymaker analysis
accomplishes neither goal in the context of municipal liability for unconstitutional bail, fine, and
fee practices. Instead, courts choose a simpler route and look to a how state law defines a judge
without actually considering how a local judge may be carrying out a city’s policies through judicial
orders.
149
Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. 2017),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15184 [https://perma.cc/24WY-AGSM] (on file with the University of
Michigan Law School); see also Complaint at 1±2, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. Feb.
17, 2016), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-GA-0013-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T7Y-3GXZ].
150
Complaint at 13, 16, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 17, 2016);
Amended Complaint at 2, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. April 1, 2016),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-GA-0013-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ5X-3FHG].
151
Complaint at 5, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 17, 2016).
152
Amended Complaint at 20±24, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. April
1, 2016).
153
See Settlement Agreement, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21,
2017), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-GA-0013-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HU-TV94]; Consent
Order, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, 2:16-cv-00030-RWS (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-GA-0013-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J6T-JF3F].
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Given that a consideration of all facts could be made, a functional approach would uncover
those instances in which a judge is acting as an arm of the city to impose fines and fees in order to
raise revenue. In such cases, the municipality should have to pay money damages to plaintiffs who
have suffered due to the city’s goal of improving its bottom line through its judges. Themunicipality
should not be able to escape liability by simply raising the defense that a judge is independent. Thus,
a city complicit in setting up an unconstitutional regime of bail, fines, and fees would be more likely
to face liability under a functional approach to policymaker determinations. This, in turn, would
ultimately better serve the compensation and deterrence values of Section 1983 by providing
plaintiffs a viable route to pursuing money damages.
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